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Liberalism and critical Marxism:  
A reply to Glasman and Rutherford 
Matt Bolton and Frederick Harry Pitts 
 
Abstract 
In this reply to Maurice Glasman and Jonathan Rutherford's response to the authors' earlier 
critical comparison of Corbynism and Blue Labour, the authors clarify and further develop 
three core components of the original critique, covering, respectively, 1) identity politics and 
identity liberalism; 2) agonism and abstraction; and 3) Marxism and liberalism. First, the 
authors reconceptualise the forms of left identity politics and 'identity liberalism' criticised by 
Glasman and Rutherford as struggles 'in and against' identification, the fluidity of which is not 
found in the forms of national belonging prioritised by Blue Labour. Second, the authors 
suggest that there is an absence of any notion of mediation in the agonistic mode of politics 
espoused by Glasman and Rutherford, and that this precludes an accurate conceptualisation 
of capitalism as a global system of abstract and indirect social domination to which a simple 
restoration of national or popular sovereignty around issues such as Brexit and immigration 
poses no solution. Third, the authors clarify the claim that the liberal centre must be 
pessimistically defended at a time of its crisis, drawing upon the 'articles of reconciliation' 
between Marxism and liberalism proposed in the work of the late Norman Geras. 
 
Introduction 
We read with interest the considered reply received from two architects of Blue Labour, 
one of the targets of our article’s critique. Maurice and Jonathan’s response provides 
some useful clarifications and further development of key aspects of Blue Labour 
thinking some among the latter’s more recent converts might do well to take on board. 
They contend that the common good is about the negotiation and not the liquidation 
of ‘estranged interests’, and any national popular project would not abolish antagonism 
but construct itself through dissensus and pluralism. They stress that the rhetorical 
category of the so-called ‘white working class’ is not one for which Blue Labour 
especially cares, and that culture is not something fixed but everchanging. 
Sovereignty, for them, is more complex than a simplistic and impossible ‘control’, and 
their patriotism rests not in isolationism but an internationalist impulse of self-
determination and solidarity. Moreover, they are ‘liberal’ in the sense espoused by the 
eighteenth-century British enlightenment, and not in the universalising European 
tradition of Hegel et al within which our work is broadly grounded. They also reaffirm 
perhaps Blue Labour’s biggest selling points, which are respectively the commitment 
to a politics of paradox attuned to the persistence of contradiction, and the critique of 
commodification as a negative process of social domination, rather than something 
enforced or endured by vying groups. 
In these respects, Maurice and Jonathan represent that part of Blue Labour that, until 
Corbynism came along, occupied a lonely position in the Labour Party’s intellectual 
life trying to eke out the rudiments of a politically practicable philosophical orientation 
capable of capturing capitalism critically. Whilst we do not share the external 
standpoint Blue Labour assumes in making this critique – shortly, in the name of the 
nation (or national culture) against the commodifying forces of global capital – the 
enterprise was, for the most part, a welcome beacon of thoughtfulness in a party 
otherwise gradually desiccating in cynical political calculation. Of course, Corbynism 
has now arrived with a whole slew of new thinkers and ideas capable, within major 
constraints, of comprehending aspects of capitalist society halfway critically – 
sometimes, as we suggest in the paper, adopting very similar standpoints to those 
assumed by Blue Labour, with which we also differ. But the point stands that Blue 
Labour showed a willingness to engage in serious intellectual work at a time where it 
was deeply unfashionable to do so, before Corbynism’s heady theoretical constitution 
reinvigorated the resources on which the left and centre-left can draw. Indeed, 
Corbynism’s direction of travel in recent months suggests a more substantive and 
practical crossover between the two positions.  
We are all to some extent powerless to curate how ideas are received. The high 
priesthood of Corbynism cannot contain the occasionally overzealous members and 
supporters who mobilise around Corbyn online and In Real Life. Meanwhile, Blue 
Labour finds itself in surprising rude health considering the absence of any clear 
channel of influence or factional base in a shifting Labour Party. This has been 
sustained by bringing together a set of divergent political projects, aspirations and 
interests that each place different emphases on contemporary events and express 
apparently popular impulses in different ways. There is the Blue Labour that contains 
the seeds of an emancipatory cultural and political-economic critique of 
commodification and abstraction. It is in this space that Maurice and Jonathan have 
typically operated, along with many of their likeminded thinkers. But like the 
uncontainable elements within the Corbynist flock, Blue Labour gains at least some of 
its continuing salience, even as its direct political presence is on the wane, from those 
drawn to the project because of its perceived status as a locus for a certain reactionary 
orientation to questions of identity, migration and nationhood that has become 
increasingly assertive in the wake of the rise of the right in recent years. Here the 
subtlety and thoughtfulness of Maurice and Jonathan’s response is disregarded in 
favour of claims to better and worse forms of authenticity and belonging, conveniently 
burnished with intellectual kudos by pop-academic bestsellers warning against the 
dangers of the wrong kind of identity, or, even, the dangers posed by those citizens of 
nowhere who possess none at all (e.g. Goodhart 2017). 
The question is whether Blue Labour provides an intellectual environment that 
incubates any of this, and whether those viable elements of the project that Maurice 
and Jonathan raise in their response can be rescued from the implication of many of 
its core ideas in a political context quite different from when Blue Labour began. Whilst 
the more scholarly and sophisticated quarters of Blue Labour place subtler stresses 
than some advocates, there is nonetheless a necessity to idiot-proof ideas against 
their misappropriation in an age of extremes. To take one example: Maurice and 
Jonathan are justifiably wary of our apparent but unstated and entirely unintended 
insinuation that Blue Labour shares some affinity with the Vichy romanticisation of 
‘Travail, famille, patrie’. We did not have this in mind, but it has to be said that such 
appeals are somewhat undermined by the Blue Labour website carrying as its header 
the slogan ‘Work, Family, Community’. With the gentler ‘Community’ standing in for 
‘Fatherland’, this is an almost precise English translation of the tripartite motto of the 
collaborationist regime in France, which temporarily replaced the altogether more 
agreeable and continuingly relevant revolutionary watchword ‘Liberté, Egalité, 
Fraternité’. Whilst we did not, and do not, seek to insinuate any connection between 
Blue Labour and Vichy, the choice of words here is obscure and coincidental enough 
to suggest such a comparison, had we chosen to make it, would be overly strong but 
not entirely without foundation. All good intentions aside, it demonstrates how carefully 
this territory must be treaded. 
 BLUE CORBYNISM 
The above example is just one instance of a number where Maurice and Jonathan 
suggest we are guilty of misunderstanding or misrepresenting Blue Labour thinking. 
Now, it must be said that in the perspicuous way Maurice and Jonathan present them, 
the core ideas of Blue Labour both move some way past how Blue Labour thinking is 
appropriated in the wider public and political sphere, and sometimes appear in a quite 
different light than our critical reconstruction of them allowed. Critique, which rests on 
critical reconstruction as a means of getting inside its object, is commonly met with the 
riposte that the ideas critiqued have been represented inaccurately. It is a permanent 
peril of the critical method and we have been charged with as much in this case. But 
the critical purposes to which we put the discussion of Blue Labour in our original piece 
– in order to highlight points of convergence with the Corbynist current to which it 
claims to constitute the only coherent alternative – remain intact in spite of any 
clarifications on the part of its proponents.  
Interestingly, in the days after Maurice and Jonathan’s response was initially 
published, news emerged, by way of a New Statesman profile of John McDonnell, that 
Labour’s Shadow Chancellor had perceived enough shared ground with at least some 
tenets of Blue Labour to hold policy discussions with Lord Glasman (Eaton 2018). 
According to the report, McDonnell kicked things off with the question, characteristic 
of the intellectual curiosity that sets him apart from Corbyn, ‘where do we disagree?’ 
This followed the launch of the ‘Full Brexit’, bringing key Blue Labour figures together 
with other Lexiteers constituting an increasingly assertive and influential presence in 
the Corbyn movement.1 Meanwhile, on the continent, key influence Wolfgang Streeck 
was among the founding signatories to Aufstehen, a new anti-migrant left movement 
inspired in equal measure by the appropriation of ideas from Blue Labour and 
organisational politics from Momentum (Oltermann 2018). Back in the UK, there has 
been a remarkable convergence between how Blue Labour outriders and the younger 
‘luxury communism’ wing of the Corbyn left grasp the relationship between Brexit, 
neoliberalism, globalisation and immigration. A pro-Brexit op-ed even popped up in 
the Stalinist Morning Star bearing the byline of one Maurice Glasman (Glasman 2018).  
Of course, regardless of their consequences, these coincidences between Blue 
Labour and Corbynism in themselves prove nothing more than the capacity of people 
from different political traditions to converse, combine ideas, change their minds and 
move within ideological contradictions. But this does not mean that the sometimes 
surprising configurations between Corbynist and Blue Labour positions, especially in 
light of the latter’s claim to be implacably opposed to the former, do not warrant further 
explanation and interrogation. And this is what our article sought to do. Indeed, it might 
be said that the resonances of our critique have increased lately, as Corbynism, in at 
least one of the poses it strikes on Brexit, has come to adopt a much more nationalist 
orientation on questions of sovereignty, specifically around state aid and free 
movement (Bolton and Pitts 2018b). Corbynism’s desire for the ‘national economy’ 
extolled by Blue Labour has become ever more pronounced, and is increasingly 
expressed through the same evocation of a lost cultural tradition. A ‘Build It In Britain’ 
campaign promised to repatriate the ‘thousands of jobs’ the Conservative government 
‘have sent overseas’ (Labour Party, 2018a). Another artfully shot campaign video, 
                                                          
1 https://www.thefullbrexit.com/ 
released immediately after the party’s 2018 conference, saw Labour promise to 
‘rebuild Britain’ and restore local ‘pride,’ over footage of terraced houses, cobbled 
streets and shuttered factories (Labour Party, 2018b). Far from Corbynism setting its 
electoral sights solely on what Maurice and Jonathan term the ‘socially liberal,’ with all 
their ‘snobbish progressivism,’ the party leadership’s steadfast refusal to challenge the 
nationalist logic of Brexit – in the face of concerted opposition from those who ‘Love 
Corbyn’ but ‘Hate Brexit’ – demonstrates how the tables have turned since the days 
of New Labour. Where once the ‘traditional working class’ were deemed to have 
‘nowhere else to go,’ allowing Labour to focus on the ‘aspirational’ and the 
‘progressive,’ now it is the latter who find themselves without a voice in Brexit Britain, 
while parties on all sides compete to deliver to the rooted ‘somewheres’ the fabled 
‘control’ economic protectionism will supposedly supply.   
In spite of all protestations, this opens up common ground between Corbynism and 
Blue Labour that the signs suggest some are already wittingly or unwittingly beginning 
to exploit. Whether this pleases partisans of either is another question, and it will give 
both sides something to reflect upon about their respective political projects. But the 
main purpose of our critique was to highlight the possibility or necessity of an 
alternative to both Corbynism and Blue Labour, and not accept at face value the claim 
that the only intellectual choice confronting those lost in the contemporary Labour 
Party is between one of those two competing tendencies. Nothing in the Brexit-
dominated political landscape has served to dull the compulsion to establish such an 
alternative. 
 
IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION 
These wider observations aside, there are a few elements of Maurice and Jonathan’s 
response that we would like address specifically. First, a point of textual propriety. 
Maurice and Jonathan assert that nowhere does any Blue Labour writer use the term 
‘primary community’ or ‘primary communities’ in a positive sense, but our citation of 
this term derives from Rowan Williams’s preface to a 2015 collection of Blue Labour 
writings (Williams 2015). If the former Archbishop of Canterbury is not quite a paid-up 
member of the Blue Labour tendency, then his words should still be taken as an 
endorsement of something he has seen, like us, as an assumption active in Blue 
Labour thinking: that there is some ontological privilege given to some ways of relating 
to one another above other kinds of relation.  
This recurring theme comes up in Maurice and Jonathan’s response. Parsing the 
forms of liberalism to which they do and do not subscribe, Maurice and Jonathan 
critique ‘identity liberalism’, posing it against a politics of ‘belonging’. It is worth 
lingering on what is meant by ‘identity liberalism’ in this context, as there is something 
of a contradiction at play here. We assume that the term is taken from the work of the 
American sociologist Mark Lilla, who uses it to criticise what he regards as the 
tendency amongst the contemporary US left to view society solely thorough a 
fragmented prism of essentialised identity categories – race, ethnicity, gender, 
sexuality, etc (Lilla 2016). He argues that the one identity which is not given a place in 
the contemporary left’s taxonomy of identity categories is precisely that constituency 
which is the focus of Blue Labour’s agenda – socially conservative, patriotic, culturally 
‘working class’. We can surmise that whiteness is the other missing identity here, 
although this is unstated.  
Lilla’s critique of ‘identity liberalism’ is that by solely focusing on these supposedly 
closed, static categories of identity, by demanding that members of each category 
should ‘stay in their lane,’ the shared social experiences and histories that overlap and 
blur the lines between categories are ignored. That old aim of the left, the possibility 
of building a truly concrete universality – not a universality that oppresses or wipes out 
particularity, or fixes it in place, but one that gives it the freedom to be expressed and 
recombined in new forms within a shared space of commonality and solidarity - is 
hereby lost (see Baumann 2011). This opens the door to reactionary appeals to a 
‘white identity’ which feels under threat from the rise of the ‘other’, and demands its 
own separate status. Lilla’s solution is a reinvigorated universalism, in which civic 
education and knowledge of the inextricably entwined and mutually constitutive open 
histories of supposedly isolated categories replaces the fixation on separation, 
essentialism and closure.   
In Maurice and Jonathan’s telling, however, the influence of ‘identity liberalism’ on the 
contemporary left does not lead to an overly particularistic depiction of the world and 
the loss of the possibility of concrete universality. It is the exact opposite. The left is 
here condemned for its rejection of the ‘particular and the historical in favour of the 
abstract and universal.’  As such it has assisted in the production of a ‘liberal culture 
that transcends particular places and time and which becomes a deracinated and 
standardised mono-culture.’ The answer is therefore to reject the universal and return 
to the particular, to the rooted cultural traditions of Blue Labour’s chosen constituency. 
Unlike Lilla, there is no recognition of the necessity of the universal here, no 
acknowledgement that it is precisely in the tension between the particular and the 
universal that the possibility of the ‘common good’ they pursue lies, rather than in the 
elimination of the latter by the former. Far from offering an alternative to the worst 
excesses of ‘identity liberalism,’ the totalising particularity offered here merely 
reproduces it in a new form. 
There is no reason why the identifications at stake in ‘identity liberalism’ should be any 
less meaningful or significant than the alternative categories of ‘belonging’ on which 
Blue Labour dines – nationality, class as a cultural location, faith. Class is not a cultural 
location in which one sits, but a socially constituted relationship between people and 
the world around them. Nationhood is just as socially constructed as any other basis 
for claims on ‘identity’, but far less politically repurposable. Identity politics is not – or 
does not have to be - reducible to a ‘politics of position’ that confers positive or negative 
status upon whosoever is speaking owing to who they are (Hirsh 2017). Those forms 
of identity politics that recognise social construction and move within that space bear 
the merit of emphasising the fluidity of identification as a process of active struggle to 
define and redefine oneself and one’s relationship with the world, in a spirit of mutual 
recognition of unity-in-difference. This is a little like how Maurice and Jonathan present 
their understanding of belonging as something built out of negotiation and mediation 
of individual interests. They permit of such fluidity in the terms they use to characterise 
culture as something not organic but subject to contestation and creation. At its best 
and most intersectional, ‘identity liberalism’ does and enables much the same. 
Indeed, by recognising the struggle inherent in the process of identification, against 
fixity and in favour of fluidity, it is actually so-called ‘identity liberalism’ that 
complements best underlying forms of solidarity and collective life linked not to the 
‘political nations’ that divide us, but the unity-in-difference – the ever-shifting concrete 
universal - that consists in humanity’s capacity, positive and negative, for self-
determination, suffering and so on. There is always therefore a struggle in-against-
and-beyond identification (Stoetzler 2009, Holloway 2009) in these purportedly ‘liberal’ 
forms of identity politics, insofar as they work with categories only to continually 
remould them, and by exposing them as contingent and socially constituted, highlight 
the shared humanity that remains unshifting at their core irrespective of nation or state. 
A revolt against ‘classification’ itself (Holloway 2002), class struggle exemplifies this, 
fighting not to revel in class society but to abolish it for a world of human unity-in-
difference. Gender, race and sexuality, too: all know no nation except where they are 
forced into it by those who would seek to subordinate both solidarity and particularity 
to the apparently superior forms of belonging available by way of the nation, state or 
locality. The freedom to critique, to re-examine, reconfigure, and even leave behind 
elements of the ascribed ‘position’ into which one was born is a freedom that had to 
be struggled towards for centuries. It is a freedom of which large parts of the globe are 
still deprived. The loss of an undifferentiated, simplistic, immediate unity with the world 
carries with it the possibility of uncertainty, confusion and isolation, for sure. But it is 
also the first step towards a complex, concrete form of ethical life in which the particular 
and universal restlessly combine and recombine to create new forms of collective 
flourishing and fulfilment.   
There is no reason, on this rationale, why Blue Labour’s entirely admirable 
conceptualisation of the ‘common good’ could not be applied above and beyond the 
localistic units of ‘belonging’ on which the whole narrative hinges. Why should the 
common good coincide with the ‘political nation’ – say, the UK, or, in some imaginaries, 
England – and not a wider institutional terrain capable of sustaining experimentation 
and innovation in transnational forms of citizenship? Something, perhaps, like the EU? 
Indeed, somewhere in the heritage of the ‘common good’ on the Labour centre-left 
and the prehistory of Blue Labour is Jon Cruddas’s work with Compass and the 
German SPD in the early part of the decade, which gestured towards 
conceptualisations of the ‘good society’ irreducible to application to one form of 
‘belonging’ above others, taking Europe as its canvas to go beyond the nation and 
across rather than within borders (Cruddas and Nahles 2009). Maurice and Jonathan 
pinpoint EU immigration law as a key infringement of the sovereignty of ‘political 
nations’ – but, like the state aid restrictions that also accompany single market 
membership (and which is proving the main issue at stake in Corbyn’s stance on 
Brexit), it might better be seen as precisely such a transnational vision of the common 
good, equally distributing the gains and consequences of immigration within and 
between both migrants and their host nations alike, protecting against the intra-state 
competition and migrant exploitation that would accompany a nationalist war of all 
against all. Whilst within a given national territory these effects might be experienced 
or felt differently at different regional levels – indeed, this is some of what was behind 
the Brexit vote (see Eichengreen 2018) – such interventions exemplify an 
experimental if unsatisfactory attempt at a post-national common good, on which now 
some, if not all, quarters of Blue Labour are hardly alone in calling time. Indeed, it 
might be argued that some of the problems of the EU stem from the failure to develop 
this transnational experiment to its full extent, particularly in the political sphere, where 
the absence of an established European demos or public has played into the distorted 
narratives pushed by the nationalist right. Extending the right to vote in national 
elections to all inhabitants of a particular nation, for example, may well have prevented 
successive governments pinning the blame for their political and economic travails on 
the presence of European migrants, and assisted the process of building solidarity 
between domestic and EU workers. 
 
ABSTRACTION AND AGONISM 
Maurice and Jonathan’s opposition to Britain’s continued membership of the EU rests 
on two grounds. The first is that the European project represents a distinct continental 
cultural and political tradition derived from ‘Napoleonic states’ incommensurate with 
that which can be traced back to the origins of the Common Law in England. The 
second is that the EU represents the limitation of politics – the latter here the ‘agonistic’ 
ideal type conceptualised by Chantal Mouffe – by legality (Mouffe 2000).  
On the first count, the divisions within the Blue Labour camp itself when it comes to 
the question of Britain (or England’s) relationship with Europe speak to the difficulties 
of isolating a single ‘authentic’ tradition against which all others must be judged. 
Moreover, the idea that Brexit can be explained, at least in part, by reference to a 
singular cultural tradition running in unbroken fashion all the way back to the Norman 
invasion undermines the welcome emphasis on political contestation, plurality and 
open history which underpins Maurice and Jonathan’s response. Even if Blue Labour’s 
framework of cultural tradition and shared meanings is accepted on its own terms, it 
seems just as plausible to understand the construction of the EU as a transnational 
institutional response to the common experience of the catastrophes of the twentieth 
century – an experience which continues to dominate British cultural memory – as it 
does to present it as an alien Bonapartist imposition. Similarly, given that the main 
determinant of a vote to Remain or Leave was not income, occupation, or geographic 
location but rather age – with those under 49 voting overwhelmingly to remain (and 
those only now of voting age even more emphatic) and those over 50 choosing to 
leave – it seems that while there may ‘never [have] been enthusiasm for the EEC or 
EU in England,’ this tradition of indifference and/or hostility is undergoing a process of 
transition (Goulard 2016). A genuinely open and pluralistic approach to questions of 
culture would take this into account rather than call upon the ghosts of Waterloo or 
Henry II to justify a rejectionist position. 
The second plank of Maurice and Jonathan’s argument for Brexit is the EU’s 
suppression of the moment of ‘the political.’ They suggest this rule of the legal over 
the political is played out most notably in how immigration has allegedly been moved 
from the political to the legal sphere in the UK, partly by the apparent imposition of the 
EU framework for freedom of movement. This, they claim, places free speech at threat. 
But, with immigration as with all the other things we are told cannot be talked about by 
those who feel their free speech at threat, the things we supposedly do not or cannot 
speak enough about are often precisely what we hear far too much of. For years now, 
across every airwave and printed media, we have heard seldom little else beyond the 
production and reproduction of ‘legitimate concerns’ about immigration and 
immigrants – whether by the public, politicians, the press or souring intellectuals. If the 
legal really is policing and circumscribing the agonistic political, it does not appear to 
be doing a good job – if indeed agonism can be applied to a debate so rancorous that 
the side you would wager would be most willing to defend working-class solidarity with 
workers from other countries cedes the terrain from compliant fear of anti-immigrant 
sentiment, a situation that preceded the Brexit referendum and has so worsened since 
that even the supposedly pro-migrant Leader of the Labour Party rolls in its undertow. 
Perhaps it would be preferable to return to the time where New Labour and the novel 
legal niceties of EU integration bottled up and kept pressed deeply underground some 
of the same sentiments about migration we now see traded daily by politicians of both 
right and, regrettably, left. But now they are out of the bottle it will be hard to put the 
stopper shut again. Why should those whose identity politics rest on the reactionary 
othering of outsiders have their grievances taken at face value by lettered 
ventriloquists, but those whose identities are rooted only in the search to reflexively 
self-determine and make and remake themselves be treated to the scepticism that 
attends ‘identity liberalism’ among contemporary political milieus of the right and left? 
Appeasing it will not reduce the risk of combustion, as exemplified in the nasty tenor 
the immigration conversation, the acceptance into the bosom of polite debate tribunes 
for popular prejudice, and the spiralling surge of actual and attempted far-right violence 
and terror against migrants and prominent pro-migrant political figures. It has to be 
said that in at least facing up to the reality that all is not well, especially among those 
who feel some perceived grievance around immigration, Blue Labour bests those from 
elsewhere on the left who see economic remedies alone as an easy means to 
neutralise this sense of grievance and all hold hands together in the ever after. Maurice 
and Jonathan are correct to assert the absence of any politically operationalizable 
utopianism in Blue Labour’s theoretical constitution. But this can sometimes lapse not 
into a radical pessimism capable of confronting and defeating the rising far-right but 
rather a cynicism that, instead of critically challenging their sentiments, reduces politics 
to their unmediated reflection through the posing of ‘popular’ sovereignty against 
parliamentary and legal abstraction. 
Here Blue Labour espouse a similar ‘agonistic’ mode of politics some parts of 
Corbynism lay claim to, in the latter case largely derived from Chantal Mouffe’s 
conceptualisation of a left populist tradition she places Corbynism within (Mouffe 
2018). Interestingly, Maurice and Jonathan seek to set Blue Labour apart from 
Corbynism on the basis of the latter’s ‘hard left’ politics, even though they contend the 
latter is ‘not a coherent political philosophy’. We would differ strongly on both the 
degree of agonism and the coherence present in Corbynism as it is current constituted 
(Bolton and Pitts 2018a). Whilst there is a great deal of internal dissonance between 
different strands of the piecemeal electoral and intellectual coalition constructed under 
Corbyn’s leadership, the one thing that does manage to hold the whole thing together 
is the agonistic politics that poses a morally virtuous and populistic ‘community of the 
good’ centred on Corbyn’s own incorruptibility against an opposing pole of a scheming 
and morally bereft elite (Hirsh 2015). This not only holds the project together, but 
grants Corbynism much of its political dynamism, however limited that may pan out to 
be in the long run. What else is this than agonism in its classic sense?  
Funnily enough, rather than a complement to agonism, it is precisely the commitment 
to pluralism Maurice and Jonathan express elsewhere in their response that is 
necessary to withstand and combat the populist politics that today unites left and right 
alike, in which anti-elite posturing is substituted for what could otherwise be an 
effective anti-capitalist praxis. Identity politics, where it represents fluid notions of 
identification as a social process against totalitarian or totalising forms of identity as a 
fixed characteristic or group membership, can be as much an aid to such pluralism as 
an obstacle. It is not always the ally of agonism it appears when draped in national 
flags and reactionary cultural and ethnic affiliations. But, rather than an antagonistic 
politics of class – not an identity, but rather a relation – or other forms of contested 
identification forged through struggle, both Corbynism and Blue Labour construct an 
agonistic duality around the interests of a popular subject or sovereignty and those 
imposed by outside forces arraigned around the regulatory and economic relations of 
global capital.  
For Maurice and Jonathan, just as contemporary cosmopolitan liberalism subordinates 
politics to law, Brexit marks the point at which the long subordination of popular to 
parliamentary sovereignty comes to an end. This is not dissimilar to the spirit of 
Labour’s approach to Brexit under the leadership of Corbyn and McDonnell. 
McDonnell set the path of travel when, shortly after the referendum, he promised 
extraparliamentary ‘moral pressure…across the country’ (Rampen 2016) would be 
enough to dictate the terms on which the UK would leave the EU. Labour have not 
only paid lip service to the mythical ‘popular will’ in its policy orientation under Corbyn, 
but actively rallied behind its distorted representation as determinedly pro-Brexit at 
crucial points in the progress of the issue through the parliamentary system. 
There is a shared assumption active in both Blue Labour and Corbynism, in the 
oppositions posed between the political and the legal, between the popular and the 
parliamentary, between the universal and the particular, that appears to either elide or 
abhor mediation and demand from their respective agonistic modes of doing and 
thinking politics the increasingly unmediated expression and confrontation of opposing 
political forces and principles. Sometimes this is concealed in wider calls for the 
defence of free speech, sometimes, as in Corbynism, it is expressed in assaults on 
the spirit of open criticism and scepticism that characterise the best traditions of liberal 
democracy and a free media. Either way, the problem here is that the populist 
requirement for the popular will to resound in as unmediated and unlimited a manner 
as possible. In another world, perhaps – but not this one, and certainly not now, at this 
political moment. Mediation not only permeates but characterises human society, 
specifically in the forms of mediation associated with capitalist society and the liberal 
democratic order with which it has been associated: state, commodity, money, labour, 
law. These are the modes of existence assumed by human practice and social 
relations in capitalist society, and the means by which they proceed and unfold – hence 
they are real abstractions, and not something false that can be simply stripped away 
to reveal an unmediated concrete reality underneath. The search for a world free of 
mediation is futile, only better and worse forms of it feasible. In a highly complex and 
irreversibly global society riven by contradictions, the desire for popular will without 
mediation, representation and institutional or legal form, or, for that matter, 
technological progress without social or political constraints, is dangerous because 
unattainable, and it is from this unattainability that the desire derives its peculiar 
political dynamism. 
The absence of a concept of mediation through which the abstract totality of capitalist 
society can be captured, and the forms of existence human relations assume can be 
understood, has wider consequences for both Blue Labour and Corbynism. In their 
response to our article, Maurice and Jonathan state plainly that ‘Blue Labour does not 
understand capitalism as an abstraction’ – where as we do, but only insofar as it is a 
real abstraction rooted and constituted in concrete social relations (see Sohn-Rethel 
1978). Regardless, for Blue Labour capitalism is characterised by the prevalence of 
the ‘national economic system’, or, in other words, ‘a cultural and material set of mutual 
institutions that govern a national economy’. This institutionalist line of thinking, like all 
such apparatuses up to and including its most famous appearance in the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ literature, stresses too much the possibility for national divergence within 
global capitalism and not enough the essential social relations and social forms that 
find their differential mediation in different national circumstances, principally through 
the state as itself a form within which the contradictions of capitalist social relations 
are sublated at a specific stage in their development. The essential and inescapable 
factor here is capital as an intrinsically global social relation between people and things 
– an abstract totality validated as money but constituted in human practice that is only 
mediated differently in and by the state-based ‘national economic systems’ that 
constitute the core of the Blue Labour analysis. Once again, the particular is treated in 
isolation from the universal, rather than the one existing through the other.  
Indeed, it is the reluctance to face up to the intractable reduction of all life to the 
workings of the global capitalist economy that leads both Blue Labour and Corbynism 
into the wishful thinking of Lexit, where all the UK has to do is opt out for sovereign 
control to be restored. The refusal both of mediation and the salience of what is 
mediated is akin to the aforementioned inability to see identity politics as, at its best 
and where not segregated, essentialist or ontological, the working out of processes of 
identification, in-against-and-beyond identity itself, that in shifting times and places 
mediate without resolution the human unity-in-difference that is the basis for any true 
‘common good’. In spite of the seeming intentions of those on all sides of the debate, 
there is no necessary agonism or opposition here, only mediation – or rather, the 
longed-for agonism is only possible within and through the mediated form of concrete 
universality, if it is not to descend into the mutual destruction of culture war. 
 
ARTICLES OF RECONCILIATION 
Maurice and Jonathan close by expressing their interest in knowing more about our 
‘undefined philosophical alternative of ‘critical Marxism’’ that, we claim ‘would be 
capable of ‘holding the centre’.’ To clarify, we are not sure that an academic ‘critical 
Marxism’ can singlehandedly ‘hold the centre’. But it may act as a theoretical 
orientation supporting and informing a politics that could, for the time being at least, 
set itself this practical task. This response-to-the-response may have already shed 
more light on our thinking, specifically around the significance of concepts like 
mediation to how we understand society and how we critically reconstruct the way 
others understand society. But, by way of conclusion, we will outline a little more what 
such a critical alternative might consist of. Maurice and Jonathan nicely capture some 
part of it with their own positive characterisation of what they think it might mean: ‘a 
politics that deepens both democracy and liberty within a framework of shared civic 
institutions’, a ‘democratic and ethical socialism’ that seeks to ‘redistribute power and 
constrain the domination of both market and state’. This is all good, and there is no 
doubt common ground. But there is more to say. 
To some extent our proposal of a critical Marxist concord with the liberal centre at a 
time of its crisis is out of recognition that a ‘holding pattern’ is necessary in the wake 
of a rightwards swing precipitated by the rise of nativist populism, and pending any 
meaningfully transformative, electorally dynamic alternative. But it also reflects a 
theoretical disposition and political orientation best captured, perhaps, in the work of 
the late Norman Geras, for whom it was necessary to strike ‘articles of reconciliation’ 
between Marxism and key tenets of liberal political theory owing precisely to the lack 
within the former of any properly worked-out understanding of democracy and the 
democratic transformation of the world (Geras 2017). Liberalism contains the capacity 
to partway plug that gap by remedying its cause, which for Marxism is a cynicism about 
bourgeois democratic rights that sometimes manifests in acquiescence with illiberal 
and totalitarian modes of governance, as well as populist or majoritarian forms of 
politics. What a Marxist appropriation of liberal thinking puts forward to fill this void is 
a normative conceptualisation of human rights, the separation of powers, and pluralist 
political mediation and representation. These are seen not as inextricably intertwined 
with and complicit in capitalist society, but rather separable, by degrees, from it, insofar 
as they set limits on the latter through laws and institutions and can offer more than 
the purely negative and frequently inequitable constraints liberalism places on property 
and wealth.  
As a bulwark against humanity’s greatest evils, such articles of reconciliation also 
propose positive forms of political responsibility specifically around what Geras defines 
as a duty of mutual care or aid. For this he draws upon the idea of natural right latent 
in Marx’s work, centred upon an intergenerational shared humanity characterised not 
by inexhaustible Promethean possibility but rather the presence of human limits, 
deficiencies and imperfections. Extending positive duties of mutual aid and care on 
this basis implies the political salience of a ‘planetary consciousness’ that constructs 
solidarity not only across, but irrespective of, national borders and takes as its political 
constituency a global human subject increasingly at threat at a time where the 
institutional architecture that makes such a subject visible at the international level is 
breaking down and the wills of national peoples are posed against cosmopolitan 
‘citizens of nowhere’. The institutional life that liberalism helps guarantee, extended 
over and beyond borders on the terrain of the global, is part of the scaffolding by which 
such a constituency can be constructed, and part of ‘helping the centre hold’ is 
retaining what little of this remains, in pursuit of wider transformative social change. 
This means staying strong against the nativist and nationalist populism that threatens 
to tear it apart. 
Under the cloud of a critical Marxism, the pursuit of transformative social change is 
laced with pessimism insofar as it must be total but cannot be, and so entails we do 
what is necessary to hold open the possibility of future emancipation rather than 
prematurely closing it down in the name of its fulfilment. Geras terms this the pursuit 
of ‘minimum utopia’, insofar as human limits are conceptualised as the essence of any 
universal human subject capable of bringing change about for the better. This means 
that only such a ‘minimum utopia’ of guarantees against the worst of things is either 
realisable or, for that matter, desirable, as the search for abolition of limits and 
imperfections leads only to untold misery. The abolition of class society and capitalism 
alone, whilst happy enough an outcome if the conditions are right, is not enough to 
remove them. There is something, perhaps, in this recognition of intractability that 
resonates with Blue Labour’s best side, that ‘politics of paradox’ that rests in 
contradiction and seeks no closure. Indeed, the grounds for likeminded critiques of the 
totalising aspirations for ‘Fully Automated Luxury Communism’ (Bastani 2019) and its 
ilk are clear here, and illustrate the shared convictions and orientations that constitute 
a vital point of overlap between what we are saying and what Maurice and Jonathan 
might espouse.  
But it is something like a ‘politics of paradox’ that, right now, recommends the pursuit 
of an unhappy and pessimistic accommodation with aspects of the centre – a defence 
of the global, the mediated and the liberal against those on left and right alike who 
seek to assail them for something better purportedly set on its way by Brexit, Trump 
and the rest. Whether the global ‘neoliberal’ order is on the wane and national 
economies newly resurgent or not, we see no hope in the present political moment, 
and on this we differ not only from Maurice and Jonathan, but from much of Corbynism 
too. Maurice’s own words aimed at New Labour are worth remembering (Glasman 
2016): ‘Things don’t only get better, they get worse’. 
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